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Still Aiming Wrong Target 
Case for Business Method and Software Patents from 
a Business Perspective t 
Kristen Osenga * 
INTRODUCTION 
Haste in every business brings failures. - Herodotus 
Ten years ago, business method inventions went from being ineligible for patent 
protection to eligible, nearly overnight. In 2008, the tide shifted just as quickly 
in the other direction, calling into question which, if any, business method and 
sofuvare inventions can be patented. In the intervening years, there has been much 
angst surrounding patents on business methods and software. The evils of these 
patents have been hailed by everyone from judges' to academics2 to mainstream 
Editors' Note: This chapter was written prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski v. Kappas, 
which affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Bilski but modified its rationale. 56r U.S. 
593, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Contrary to the Federal Circuit, the Court held that the machine-or-
trnnsformation test was not the sole test for determining the patent eligibility of a process. Rather, 
that test was only "a useful and important clue ... for determining whether some claimed inventions 
are processes under § 10i." Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. However, Osenga's argument is not based on 
the precise rationale of the Federal Circuit's decision. In fact, this chapter recognizes that the result 
of the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Bilski would likely lead to a reduction in the scope 
of patentable subject matter for business methods. So although this chapter should be read with an 
understanding of the later history of the /3i1sl?i case, its discussion of the broader arguments for and 
against business method and software patents remains instructive. 
Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1 
See, e.g., Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. 548 U.S. 124, i38 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting that even if the claims in question were valid, it is important to debate whether the 
granting of business method patents "adequately reflects the 'careful balance' that the 'federal patent 
laws ... embody"'); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J. dissenting) ("Business 
method patents do not promote the 'useful arts' because they are not directed to any technological or 
scientific innovation."). 
See, e.g., Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents, 28 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 6r (2002); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for 
Business?, i6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000). 
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media.3 In fact, it is media coverage of this type of patent that may shape the 
layperson's perspective on intellectual property law generally.4 
To be sure, there are abundant examples of problematic patents on business 
method and software inventions, such as the much maligned Amazon one-click 
patent.5 But there are problems with patents on many other types of inventions, 
particularly those in burgeoning fields that had previously not been covered by 
patent protection. 6 In the case of business methods and software, these concerns have 
prompted some to suggest that patents should not be granted for these inventions.7 
Recently the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit seems to have embraced 
this suggestion and has made it much more difficult to obtain patent protection for 
business method and software inventions. And now, the Supreme Court is poised to 
consider the issue. 
In an earlier article, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter,8 I argue 
that the opposition to business method and software patents is misplaced. Because 
of the firestorm surrounding these patents, the PTO and the courts are using proxy-
type inquiries to cut off the patentability analysis of these inventions at the threshold 
step. I contend that it is inappropriate to use the statutory subject matter inquiry to 
avoid more difficult questions of patentability and policy. Instead the PTO should 
be examining and the courts should be reviewing these inventions on an individual 
basis and on their merits, just as we do with every other type of invention. 
It is not just the PTO and the courts that are avoiding difficult inquiries by wielding 
the statutory subject matter sword. Scholarship from the legal and business fields has 
3 See, e.g., Peter J. Howe, 'Business Methods' Patents Raise the Stakes, BosTON GLOBE (July 5, 2005) C1; 
Jonathan Krim, Patenting Air or Protecting Property? Infonnation Age invents a New Problem, WASH. 
PosT (Dec. 11, 2003) E01. 
4 Consider that there has even been coverage of business method patents in the New York Times 
Magazine. See, e.g., James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG. at47 (Mar. 12, 2000) (describing 
the patent system as "in crisis" because of business method patents and further claiming that "[a] series 
of unplanned mutations have transformed patents into a positive threat to the digital economy."). 
The New York Times Magazine is a supplement to the paper that typically includes longer feature 
stories, along with fashion and style photography, See Wikipeclia. At the encl of May 2009, its cover 
story was about Conan O'Brien taking over the Tonight Show seat. This is clearly not the business 
section of the paper. 
5 The Amazon patent is U.S. Patent No. 5,960'411, Method and system for placing a purchase order via a 
communications networi<. For some of the back story about this patent's histo1y, see, e.g., Evan Ratliff, 
Patent Upending, WIRED (June 2000) (available at http://www.wirecl.com/wirecl/archive/8.o6/patents 
.html) (last visited Mar. 20, 2011). 
6 See, e.g., Raj Bawa, Nanotechnology Patent Proliferation and the Crisis at the U.S. Patent Office, 
17 ALBANY L.J. Ser. & TECH. 699 (2007) (describing problems relating to the growing field of nan-
otechnology); Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biophamwceutical Patents, 11 B.U. 
J. Ser. & TECH. L. 1, 6i (same for biopharmaceutical inventions). See also Katherine J. Strandburg 
et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the "Patent Explosion." 
21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. i293, i321-22 (zoo7) (noting that the "issuance of a burgeoning number of 
patents" has led to a perception that the entire patent system is "off balance"). 
See Pollack, supra note 2; Dreyfuss, supra note 2. 
Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Gww, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZONA ST. L.J. 1087 (2007). 
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called for an end to business method and software patents, basing their arguments 
on misplaced proxy-type reasoning.9 In this chapter, I argue that, if we can dig into 
the literature and expose these proxy arguments about business method and software 
patenting, a solid case can be made that business method and software patents, done 
right, can be good for business. 
In Part I, I briefly discuss the rise and recent fall of business method patents. Part 
II covers the scholarly literature discussing business method and software patents. In 
Part III, I explain the proxy argument that I have made elsewhere and show how it 
plays in the recent decisions surrounding the patent eligibility of business method 
and software inventions. I then explain why the analysis of business method and 
software patents in the literature uses the same proxy-type arguments to avoid more 
difficult questions of patentability and policy. Finally, I conclude by explaining how 
business method and software patents, if administered properly, are actually good 
for business. 
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF BUSINESS METHOD PATENTING 
Nothing is illegal if a hundred businessmen decide to do it. -Andrew Young 
The rise of patent eligibility for business method and software inventions is a tale 
that been told many times over.'0 Although it is possible to find issued patents 
describing methods of doing business dating back to the late i7oos," the story gets 
more interesting some two hundred years later. After a string of Supreme Court 
cases in the i97os and i98os that led to the eligibility of software for patenting,'2 the 
9 Some of the scholarship covers exclusively business methods, whereas other works cover software. 
This chapter treats both simultaneously, because there is significant overlap between these two types 
of invention and they share similar characteristics. See, e.g., remarks of Bob Hunt, The Limits of 
J\.bsb·act Patents in an lntangihle Economy, Brookings Institution conference, transcript available 
at http: //www. brookings. ed u/ ~I media/Files/ even ts/2009/ 0114_paten ts/ o lL:f-paten ts_transcri pt. pdf, Jan. 
14, 2009, at p. 17 (Brookings Transcript) (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (noting a study that found four out 
of five business method patents are also software patents); Bronwyn Hall, Business Method Patents, 
Innovation, 6 Policy, NEER Working Paper at2 (2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfrn?abstracLid=463160 (last visited Mar 20, 2011). There are some scholars, however, who separate 
the two types of invention, encouraging patent protection of software but not business methods. See, 
e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 280 ("we are keeping the bath water (business method patents) when 
all we really need or want is the baby (patents on software)"). 
1° For just a few exemplary explications of the history of business method and software patents, see 
Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 855, 862-69 
(2007); Osenga, supra note 8, at 1092-1103; John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liheral Professions, 
40 B.C. L. REV. n39, 1148-62 (1999). 
11 See patent to Jacob Perkins, "Detecting Counterfeit Notes," granted 3/i9/i799 (more detail desh·oyed 
by PTO fire of 1836); Patent to John Kneass, "A Mode of Preventing Counterfeiting," granted 4/z8/i815. 
Business methods were first called into question for eligibility for patenting in 1908, I-late! Security 
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2nd Cir. 1908). 
12 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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Federal Circuit held in the late i99os that there was no such thing as a business 
method exception to patentable subject matter, opening the patent eligibility door 
for these inventions as we!J. 13 In short order, this holding led to a flood of filings 
of patent applications directed toward business method inventions. 14 Applications 
covering these inventions increased from some i300 filed in 1998 to nearly 8000 filed 
in 2ooi. 15 
As the number of patent applications covering business method inventions 
quickly skyrocketed, the objections to these patents also grew. Courts, industry, 
and mainstream media all lodged complaints against the patent eligibility of busi-
ness methods and software inventions.16 Interestingly, many of these complaints 
might be unfounded - they were based either on supposition, disdain, or, at best, 
a handful of anecdotes about unrepresentative business method patents, such as 
Amazon's one-click process. 17 The hostility of the various parties grew palpable 
as systemic criticisms abounded about the PTO's failure to adequately examine 
patent applications in general, and particularly applications for these types of 
invention. 18 
Perhaps in response to this loudening chorus calling for the encl of patent pro-
tection for business method and software inventions, the PTO and the courts began 
to close the door. In 2007, the Federal Circuit issued two important opinions, In re 
Nuijten'9 and Jn re Comiskey,20 that began to rein in the previously broad expanse of 
patent-eligible subject matter. In the Nuitjen case, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that, regardless of utility, claims directed to electrical signals did not fall within 
the four categories of patent-eligible subject matter: processes, machines, articles of 
manufacture, and compositions of matter. 21 In the Comiskey case, the court held 
that, even though a set of steps has practical application, it can still be an abstract idea 
or algorithm that is ineligible for patenting, particularly if it is only a set of mental 
steps. 22 These cases, and similar appeals working their way through the PTO, laid 
the foundation for the death knell that was to come - the Federal Circuit's In re 
Bilski case. 
13 See State Street Bank 6 T111st Co. v. Signature Financial Croup, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
AT6T Corp. v. Excel Comm'ns, Inc., 172 F. 3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
'4 Starling David Hunter III, Have Business Method Patents Gotten a Bum Rap? Some Empirical 
Evidence, 6]. INFO TECH. THEORY & APPLICATION 1, 1 (2004). 
15 See id. 
16 See notes 1-3, supra; Hunter, supra note 14, at 1-2. 
'7 See Hunter, supra note 14, at 2-3. 
18 See Osenga, su/Jra note 8, at 1114-15; Hunter, supra note 14, at 3 (highlighting "disdain" for business 
method patents, "distrust of motives" and the examination process at the PTO, and "dismay" at the 
consequences that may flow from these patents). 
19 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
20 499 F.3cl 1365 (Feel. Cir. 2007). 
21 Nuitjen, 500 F.3d at 1354· 
22 Comiske:y, 499 F. 3cl at 1376-77. 
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In i997, Bilski filed a patent application on a method of hedging risk to be 
practiced by a commodity provider.23 When the commodity provider enters into 
a contract to sell to a consumer at one fixed rate, the provider makes a second 
hedging transaction at a second rate with a second consumer, thereby reducing 
the risk associated with market fluctuations. 24 The PTO rejected the claims under 
§ 101 because the invention was "not implemented on a specific apparatus and 
merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a purely mathematical problem 
without any limitation to a practical application.''25 Bilski appealed the examiner's 
rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), which affirmed 
the rejection of the claims as nonstatutory subject matter.26 
Bilski then appealed to the Federal Circuit, and oral argument was held before 
a three-judge panel in October 2007, shortly after the September 2007 decisions in 
Comislcey and Nuitjerz. Before an opinion was issued, the Federal Circuit sua sponte 
ordered an en bane rehearing to consider the question of patent-eligible subject 
matter under§ 10i.
2
7 Ora] argument was heard on May 8, 2008, and the opinion was 
issued on October 30, 2008. The court's opinion was expressly limited to determining 
what constitutes a patent-eligible "process" under 35 U.S.C. § wi. 2H After reviewing 
its own statutory subject matter jurisprudence, as well as precedent from the Supreme 
Court, the Federal Circuit implemented the "machine-or-transformation" (MoT) 
test for determining whether a method is a patent-eligible process. 29 On June i, 
2009, the Supreme Court granted Bilski's petition for writ of certiorari to review the 
Federal Circuit's decision.30' Based on comments made by sitting Supreme Court 
2
3 Ex paite Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364 (BPAI Sept. 26, 2006), aff'd on other grounds, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
24 Claim r is an exemplary claim and recites: 
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider 
at a fixed price comprising the steps of: 
(a) 
Initiating a series of b·ansactions behveen said commodity provider and consumers of said 
commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon 
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; 
(b) Identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said 
consumers; and 
(c) Initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market pmtici-
pants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions balances 
the risk position of said series of consumer transactions. 25 
Ex {Jarte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, slip op. at 3. 26 See id. 
27 
In re Bilsl?i, 264 Fed. Appx. 896 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 28 I 
n re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 95r. 29 
Id. at 954. In doing so, the court overturned its earlier "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test for 
statutory subject matter. Id. at 956. 30 
See Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 556 U.S. u68 (June r, 2009) (order granting petition for writ of Certiorari). 
'" Editors' Note: This article was written prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski v. Kappas, which 
affirmed the Federal Circuit's decision in Jn re Bilski but modified its rationale. 56i U.S. 593, r30 
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Justices in other cases,3' it is not clear that the patent eligibility for business method 
and software inventions is going to be as expansive as it was before. 
Although the reaction to Bilski from intellectual property practitioners is mixed 
(but largely negative),32 the reaction from business and industry has been fairly 
positive.33 The happiness of members of the business and entrepreneurial commu-
nity with Bilski likely flows from their concerns about business method and software 
patents. These concerns are discussed in the next section. 
II. THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS METHOD PATENTING 
Stop going for the easy buck and start producing something with your life. Create, 
instead of living off the buying and selling of others. -Martin Sheen (as character Carl 
Fox) in Wall Street 
As noted earlier, it is not just the PTO and the courts that are calling for the cessation 
or, at least, the restriction of patent eligibility for business method and software 
patents. Scholars writing about the business of business method and software patents 
have also called for changes in patent protection of these inventions, some going so 
far as to state that these patents "play a central role in the failure of the patent system 
as a whole."34 There are, of course, some who claim the evidence does not bear this 
out and that there have been patents on these inventions for years without causing a 
catastrophe in the patent system.35 Yet, the criticisms persist and must be addressed. 
The bulk of the complaints coming from the literature can be summed up in three 
main, and quite interrelated, categories: abstractness and breadth, low quality, and 
negative effects on innovation and competition.36 
S. Ct. 3218 (zo10). Contra1y to the Federal Circuit, the Court held that the MoT test was not the sole 
test for determining the patent eligibility of a process. Rather, that test was only "a useful and important 
clue ... for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 10i." Bilski, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3227. 
3
1 
See note i, supra. One of the Justices who questioned business method patents, Justice Souter, retired 
from the bench in 2009. It is unknown whether his replacement will share a similar viewpoint. [Editors' 
Note: His replacement, Justice Sotomayor, joined Justice Stevens's concurrence in In re Bilski, which 
would have held that all business methods are patent-ineligible for failing to describe a process under 
§ loi. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232.] 
3
2 See, e.g., Gary Odom, Milking Bilski, The Patent Prospector Blog, available at http://www.patenthawk 
.com/blog/zoo8/n/milking_bilski.html (Nov. 1, 2008) (last visited Mar. 2i, 2on) (providing a summary 
of commentary on the then just-issued Bi/sh opinion, as well as allowing an open comment thread 
that demonstrates both positive and negative viewpoints). 
33 See, e.g., remarks of David Kappas, Brookings Transcript at 80-1 ("I view the Bilski decision as being a 
good piece of work on the part of the Federal Circuit and an important step in the right direction ... ") 
34 JAMES BESSEN & l\!!JCHAEL J. 1VJEURER, PATENT FAILURE 214 (2008). 
35 See Hunter, supra note 14, at 1-2. 
3
6 
Cf id. at 14, at 4 (dividing the complaints about business method patents into three categories 
- process issues (examination problems), patents qua patents (quality), and proliferation (stifling 
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A. Abstract Technology and Broad Claims 
One of the primary complaints about business method and software patents is that 
they cover abstract technologies and claim broad territory. Their abstractness and 
breadth then allow the patentee to adversely affect innovation by encompassing 
entire industries and competition through opportunistic litigation.37 
There is a distinction between abstractness and breadth, although patent claims 
can certainly be both abstract and broad. The abstract nature of business method 
and software patents is attributed to the fact that they often claim results, rather 
than the method to achieve the results.38 Breadth, in contrast, refers simply to an 
expansive scope of protection. Both abstractness and breadth arise where patent 
claims are not limited to a distinct embodiment, where vague language is used 
(either inadvertently or strategically), or wherever the boundaries of the invented 
technology are unclear.39 Abstrach1ess and breadth work together to permit patent 
claims tl1at cover technologies that may not even be known to the inventor.4° 
There are a few reasons why abstractness and breadth are troublesome. First, 
inventors are being rewarded for something they did not invent and may not even 
know about.4' This goes against the reward theory for patents, which justifies the 
patent monopoly as being necessary to encourage inventors to invent and innovate.42 
Second, the abstract nature makes it difficult for competitors to determine the 
boundaries of the patentee's exclusive rights.43 The notice provided by the patent 
is low, the costs of determining boundaries are high, and the costs are not linear.44 
Finally, and this overlaps with another set of criticisms discussed later, the breadth 
and abstractness of these patent claims dominate potential downstream uses.45 
innovation and competition). See also Rob Tiller (vice president and assistant general coun-
sel for IP of Red Hat), Brookings Conference on Software and Business Method Patents High-
lights Need for Reform, available at http://press.redhat.com/zoo9/01/i9/brookings-conference-on-
software-and-business-methods-highlights-need-for-reform (last visited 5/i9/09) (claiming the dysfunc-
tionality of the patent system for business methods is a result of unmanageable litigation risks, unpre-
dictable and fuzzy boundaries, and difficulty in identifying prior art). 
37 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 199-200; Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible 
Patents Before Breahfast, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 577, 590 (1999). 
38 See remarks of David Kappas, Brookings Transcript, suf;ra note 33, at 79. See also id. at 85 ("[T]he 
patenting of abstractions, especially business methods, has drive a real ends justifies the means kind 
of philosophy in the patent system, whereby we're approaching patents in a way that's covering the 
results, right, not how the results are achieved, and that I think is very, very dangerous."). 
39 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34, at 200. 
4o See id. at 199. 
41 See id. at 200. 
42 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Indus/Jy, 
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 n. 5 (2001). 
43 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34 at 200. 
44 See remarks of Peter Men ell, Brookings Transcript, supra note 9, at 14-15. 
45 See remarks of Rochelle Dreyfuss, Brookings Transcript at 89-90; see also remarks of Josh Sarnoff, 
Brookings Transcript at 117. 
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B. Quality Issues 
Another common complaint about business method and software patents is that an 
inordinate number are "bad" or of low quality. Although there are a few different 
definitions of what constitutes a "bad" patent, it is safe to say that any patent that 
protects an invention that was well known before the application is filed is not good.46 
These patents impose numerous and substantial costs on the system,47 including 
rewarding the patentee for something she did not invent, taking the invention out 
of the public domain, and causing notice problems because competitors believe the 
invention to be freely available. 
Although the problem of patent quality is not limited to business method and 
software patents, the crisis seems to be exacerbated in this area for several reasons. 
The most common and pervasive argument is that the prior-art field for these business 
method and software inventions is not fully developed because they have only been 
eligible for patenting for the last decade; before that, these types of inventions were 
kept secret. Even when these inventions were clisclosecl, it was not in traditional 
publications that are easily searchable by the PT0.48 As one scholar has noted, 
"knowledge about business methods resides mainly in the practices and policies of 
the firms that use them, [and J even common methods may not be documented in the 
sorts of materials that examiners can efficiently consult."49 Another contention is that 
these patents are difficult to examine properly because of abstract technology and 
breadth, described earlier. Because the patent (or application) covers a wide swath 
of territory, including possibly unknown territory, it is nearly impossible for the PTO 
to ensure that the process is novel and nonobvious. Another contention is that it is 
particularly difficult to apply the standards of patentability to business method and 
software inventions because these requirements are not absolute - novelty is not a 
black-or-white standard. 5° 
Patent quality has been the subject of empirical study. For example, Starling 
Hunter reviewed a sample of business method patents for the amount of prior-art 
citation. He argues that because these patents cite as much, if not more, prior 
4
6 
See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 268. See also Bronwyn Hall, supra note 9, at i3 (noting that high-quality 
patents are those that protect "an invention that is truly 'new,' rather than an invention that is already 
in widespread use but not yet patented"). 
47 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Sun>ive in the Market and I-low Should We 
Change?- The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 6i (zoo6). One of these costs is also 
opportunistic litigation, which is discussed in more detail later. 
48 See Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 269. 
49 See id. 
5° See id. at 268 (noting that the level of "newness" required for patentability depends on the field of 
invention); see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of intellectual Property, 77 GEORGETOWN L.J. 287, 
294 (r988) ("The novelty, however, does not have to be absolute. vVhat is important is that at the time 
of prope1iization the idea is thought to be generally unknown. The res cannot be common currency 
in the intellectual life of society at the time of the prope1iization."). 
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art during prosecution than patents in other technology areas, there is no reason to 
believe that business method patents are of any lesser quality than patents generallyY 
However, others argue that the amount of prior art cited is an incomplete definition 
of quality and that these patents still prove to be troublesomeY 
C. Adverse to Innovation and Competition 
The problems of abstractness, breadth, and low patent quality all give rise to concerns 
about adverse effects on innovation and competition, which is why the literature 
comes down on the side that business method and software inventions should not 
be eligible for patenting. 
i. Effects on Innovation 
The literature contends that business method and software patents decrease inno-
vation. The standard story is that patents are a necessary evil, trading a monopoly 
for the incentive to innovate and disclose.53 Generally, patent systems are important 
if there are high front-end costs or expenses to develop a new technology and low 
back-end costs, making it easy and inexpensive to duplicate the technology.54 Patent 
systems create problems where the technology is cumulative or sequential, because 
it is difficult to get rights to build on the preceding technology.55 
In the case of business method and software patents, the argument is made that 
the benefits are simply insufficient and the costs are too high. As Adam Jaffe has 
stated in testimony before Congress, "the patent system - intended to foster and 
protect innovation - is generating waste and uncertainty that hinder and threaten 
the innovative process," particularly in fields such as business methods and software 
where products are complex and progress is incremental and cumulative.56 There 
are three main arguments presented for why patents on business method and software 
inventions adversely affect innovation: These patents are unnecessary, they tie up 
downstream innovation, and they affect research and development (R&D) spending. 
First, some argue that patents are not necessary to encourage innovation on busi-
ness method and software inventions. Generally, patent protection is thought to 
encourage disclosure and prevent free-riding, thereby incentivizing further innova-
tion in an area.57 However, "[n]owhere in the substantial literature on innovation is 
51 See Hunter, supra note 14. See also John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent 
Myth, i8 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003). 
52 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34. 
53 See Hall, supra note 9, at 24 
54 See id. at i6. 
55 See id. 
56 See Iain M. Cockburn & Megan MacCarvie, Patents, Thickets, and the Financing of Early Stage 
Finns: Evidence ~from the Software Industry, NEER Working Paper 2007, p. 2 (quoting Jaffe). 
57 See Dreyfuss, su{Jra note 2, at 274-75. 
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there a statement that the United States economy suffers from a lack of innovation in 
methods of doing business [even before patents were available for these inventions]. 
Compared with the business practices of comparable economies we seem to be 
innovators .... "58 Thus, there is no justification on the upside for business method 
and software patents. 
Second, the argument is that business method and software patents have at least 
one significant downside. Because of their abstractness and breadth, these patents 
"may effectively appropriate all possible solutions to a particular problem. This direct 
restraint upon the ability of competitors to develop alternatives to the patented inven-
tion thwarts a principal aspiration of the patent system -fostering new alternatives."59 
This argument extends beyond all possible solutions to a problem, because down-
stream products are also affected by patent protection. 60 This argument is common, 
even in fields outside of business method and software;61 however, combined with 
the lack of justification on the front end, the literature argues this cost is too high. 
Finally, some literature argues that the increase in patent protection for business 
method and software inventions results in a decrease in R&D spending, which 
signals a decrease in innovation. 62 Other literature counters this argument by stating 
that R&D spending is not a good proxy for innovation, in part because this spending 
is affected by many other factors. 63 
2. Effects on '--''""',,." 
Patents on business methods and software are also said to have negative effects on 
competition. One argument is that these patents may have adverse effects on the 
market entry and exit of competitors in these fields. Another argument is that these 
patents are frequently wielded in opportunistic lawsuits that drive competitors out 
of business or protect business from normal competition. 
With respect to entry and exit,"[ e ]conomic analysis says first that competition may 
suffer when we grant a monopoly right to the inventor of a business method but it will 
5
8 See Leo J. Raskind, The State SiTeet Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection 
for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. fo, 92 (1999). 
59 See David J. Kappas, John R. Thomas & Randall J. Bluestone, A Technological Contribution Require-
ment for Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court Precedent and Policy, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & lNTELL. 
PROP. 152, 169 (2008). 
60 See Dreyfuss, su/Jra note 2, at 265 (noting that advancements in technology are not enough - a "killer 
application" of the technology is required to inspire people to adopt the new developments). 
61 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 260 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (claiming that l11e proliferation of intellectual property 
rights in the biomedical sciences decreases innovation and research in the field). 
62 See James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. ECON. 
611 (2009); James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & 
MGMT. STRATEGY 157 (2007). 
63 See Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry, Exit and Patenting in the Soflware Industry, 
NEER Working Paper 2006, p. 2. Some of these factors are competitive interaction, knowledge 
spillovers, nature of technology opportunities, and appropriability conditions. 
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benefit if this right facilitates entry into the industry by new and innovative firms." 64 
Patents can facilitate entry by signaling quality of the entrants or giving entrants 
access to profits from licensing, but it can also impede entry because patents and 
patent thickets may create a significant barrier to entrants. 65 In fact, in the software 
field, firms are less likely to enter product markets where there are more patents. 66 
This may cause a decrease in competition, although patents may strengthen the 
positi011 of players already in a market. 67 Beyond entry and exit, business method 
and software patents adversely affect competition because, as Rochelle Dreyfuss 
notes, "Winning and losing is supposed to depend on execution, not on exclusive 
rights to the moves that need to be executed."68 
Business method and software patents also affect competition through the poten-
tial for opportunistic litigation. Litigation is problematic in any technology area, 
because there are reasons beyond patent validity and infringement for a defendant 
to settle a lawsuit. First, because patent claim construction is difficult and technology 
may be complex,
6
9 the defendant may not be confident that the court will reach a 
correct decision.7° Second, until discovery is taken, it may be nearly impossible to 
distinguish behveen a strong lawsuit and a weak one.71 Finally, even a weak lawsuit 
will cost money to defend, and it might be cheaper to simply settle. 72 
These problems are alleged to be exacerbated in the case of business method and 
software patents because of abstractness and breadth, described earlier. Some argue 
that, even though many in the software industry are against patenting, a major share 
of patent lawsuits involve software patents; these scholars claim that abstractness and 
breadth lead to patents being acquired by nonsofhvare and business method firms, 
which are happy to engage in litigation and patent enforcement efforts and which cre-
ate patent thickets outside the software industiy. 73 Abstractness and breadth also lead 
to notice problems, as described earlier, which allow for opportunistic litigation.74 
64 See Hall, su/Jra note 14, at 3. 6
5 See Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 63 at 3, i3-15. 66 See id. at 33. 
60 s "d 
' ee z . at 33-34. 68 s 
ee Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 276. 69 
Business methods, however, are generally considered to be relatively simplistic, not complex. 70 
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent 
Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1, i6 (2005). 7
' See id. 
7
' See id. See also Kesan & Gallo, supra note 47, at 69 n. 36 ("Although [bad patents J are prone to attacks 
on their validity, bad patents may nevertheless deter meritorious challenges: '[SJ mall companies may 
not be willing to invest resources in such a challenge, especially with the presumption of validity that 
attends PTO decisions. Rather, it may make sense for these companies to accept a license fee from 
the patentee, thereby leaving the inappropriate patent unchallenged."') 73 
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 34 at 214. 74 
See id. at 213 ("In sum, patents on software are not just like other patents .... We attribute these 
problems [prone to litigation and boundaiy disputes] to the abstract nature of software technology; 
too many software patents claim all technologies with similar form or all means of achieving a result, 
when the actual invention is much more limited and often h·ivial.") 
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III. THE PROXY OF THE BUSINESS METHOD PATENTING 
INQUIRY 
When two men in business always agree, one of them is unnecessary. - William 
Wrigley, Jr. 
As I argue in Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subiect Matter, the PTO and 
the courts are using subject matter rejections as proxies for other, more difficult 
questions of patentability and policy.75 Subject matter rejections are particularly 
attractive because they are not based on prior art and are a "threshold inquiry," 
allowing the application to be disposed of at an early stage.76 And yet, inquiries into 
novelty and nonobviousness have been hopelessly entwined into the § 101 analysis, 
leading to a confusion of both.77 In that earlier piece, I analyzed how each of the 
then-current and former tests for patent eligibility extended beyond the appropriate 
scope of the § 101 statutory subject matter inquiry. Many of the same arguments can 
be applied to the current standard set forth in Bilski, as well as to the reasons set forth 
in the scholarly literature for eliminating patent eligibility for business method and 
software patents. 
As noted earlier, the current standard for patent eligibility of a process is the MoT 
test. The Supreme Court has granted Bilski's petition for writ of certiorari, and the 
case will be part of the Court's 2009 Term. However, as noted earlier, it is unclear 
that the Court will expand the Federal Circuit's standard for patent eligibility, and 
it may even constrict it. In any case, the test imposed by Bilslzi suffers from the same 
defect as the tests that were previously in use - the questions being asked are not 
directed toward determining statutory subject matter, but are rather proxies for more 
difficult questions of patentability and policy. 
The machine prong of Bilski asks whether the process "is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus."78 The machine used to satisfy this prong must impose 
meaningful limits and may not be merely "insignificant extra-solution activity."79 
Most currently pending business method applications and issued patents do not 
include a recitation of a machine. Many software patents and applications recite 
simply a "general purpose computer," which may become a problem given the 
Federal Circuit's comment that "[ w Je leave to future cases the elaboration of the 
precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the answers to particular 
questions, such as whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process 
75 See Osenga, supra note 8, at in5-17. 
76 See id. at 1116 ("This type of rejection is not based on prior art, and because patentable subject matter 
is a threshold issue, it allows the application to be disposed of at an early stage."); In re Comiskey, 
499 F.3d i365, 1373 n. 7 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("The § 101 issue is an antecedent question to the [other 
requirements for patentability]."). 
77 Id. 
78 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954-
79 ld. at 961-2. 
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claim to a particular machine."80 The "machine" inquiry, however, is really a proxy 
for the actual question at issue: How does the method work? This question is more 
properly posed under § n2: Did the applicant fully describe and enable her inven-
tion? If the applicant does not explain how a process is to be implemented, either by 
machine or otherwise, she fails to satis~1 the written description and/or enablement 
requirements, and the patent should not be granted or should be invalidated for that 
reason, not for lack of statutory subject matter. 
The transformation prong of Bilski asks whether the process "transforms a partic-
ular article into a different state or thing."81 The transformation "must be central to 
the purpose of the claimed process,"82 and the articles undergoing transformation 
must be physical objects or representative of physical objects.83 But again, the "trans-
formation" question is a proxy for the real question: Is it useful? That is a question 
better asked under § 101 utility. Although § 101 utility and § 101 patent eligibility both 
reside in the same statutory section, the inquiries are distinct; that is, something can 
be "useful but not subject matter (gravity), ... subject matter but not useful (purified 
chemical compositions from plants and animals with no known uses), or [neither 
useful nor subject matter J ( e-cz and naturally occurring chemical compositions with 
no known uses.)"84 Further, these two issues are subject to review by the Federal 
Circuit under different standards. 85 
Just as the PTO and courts are using the statutory subject matter inquiry as a proxy 
to avoid more difficult questions of patentability and policy, the arguments raised 
in the scholarly literature in support of eliminating business method and software 
patents are largely not about statut01y subject matter at all. Claiming that business 
method and sofnvare inventions should not be eligible for patenting misplaces the 
focus or aims at the wrong target. 
The arguments about abstractness and breadth are very similar to the concerns 
that the PTO and the courts have been addressing using, most recently, the MoT 
test. If the patent claims are sufficiently enabled and describe the invention in the 
inventor's possession, both of which are required by § n2, then the concerns about 
overbreadth and abstractness will be minimized. Specifically, the concerns that the 
patent will cover things that the inventor never contemplated or that the patent will 
cover all possible solutions relate less to situations where the inventor is held to the 
80 Id. at 9fo. 
Id. at 95+ 
82 Id. at 9fo. 
8 3 id. at 960 8 )• 4 
Robe1tA. Kreiss, Patent Protection for Computer Programs and Mathematical Algorithms: The Consti-
tutzonal Limitations on Patentable Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 75 (1999). 
See Kevin Casey et al., Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 
11
.FED.Cm. B.J. 279, 3fo (2002) (noting that subject matter is a question oflaw reviewed de nova, but 
utility ts a question of fact reviewed for clear error). 
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obligation to fully describe his invention (and the courts are then faithful in only 
giving him exclusive rights to the extent his patent describes). 
The arguments about patent quality are inextricably linked to other requirements 
of patentability, which is precisely why lumping this problem into a discussion of 
patent eligibility is so wrong. Whether or not the PTO can adequately examine 
these types of inventions should have nothing to do with the existence of patent 
protection on business methods and software. Of course, there is a problem with 
patent quality, a problem that extends beyond business methods and software. In fact, 
many people claim that the invention claimed in the Bilski application is painfully 
obvious. But the answer to this problem is not to deny patent protection to a whole 
area of innovation; rather the solution must be to improve examination standards 
and deny patents for particular applications that are not novel, obvious, or fail to be 
adequately described or enabled. 
Similarly, the complaints that business method and software patents negatively 
affect innovation and competition contain some proxy-type arguments. For exam-
ple, the concern that these patents will affect downstream innovation is related to 
the abstractness and breadth issues, which boil clown to a difficult inquiry under 
§ 112. The concern about opportunistic litigation is made much more palpable 
when the patent in question is weak, which is related to abstractness, breadth, and 
patent quality. All of these issues are better addressed under the other patentability 
requirements, namely § § 102, io3, and 112. 
IV. THE POSITIVES OF BUSINESS METHOD PATENTING 
Innovation is the specific instrument of entrepreneurship . .. the act that endows 
resources with a new capacity to create wealth." - Peter Drucker 
So what is good about business method and software patents? If we deal with the 
troublesome issues described in the literature, maybe there is no real problem. In fact, 
what may be causing the problems going forward are actually the solutions that have 
erroneously been put into place. Consider a scenario where the fields of business 
method and software patents are allowed to mature. The body of prior art becomes 
rich, and the examining corps gains expertise. Patents are only granted for inventions 
that are fully enabled and described and that are novel and nonobvious, just like in 
every other field. Then patents on business method and software inventions become 
less suspect and higher quality, and all is right with the world. 86 
Instead, the patent eligibility tests set up by the PTO and the courts, beginning 
in 2006 and culminating with the Bilski opinion, will have the opposite effect. 
86 This is not merely a pipe dream. See Martin Campbell-Kelly (cited in BESSEN & MEURER, supra 
note 34, at i88) ("History shows us that software patents are not so different from other patents in 
the information technology industries, and that the patent system is capable of adjusting to the 
particularities of individual industries."). 
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Because these inventions are no longer eligible for patenting, prior art will again 
become scarce, and the only expertise the examiners will get is in making quick 
rejections for lack of statutory subject matter. Instead of moving forward toward a 
system of higher quality business method and software patents, we are taking two 
steps backward. 
But let us go back to the first scenario. Business method and software patents have 
improved in quality. The issues of abstractness, breadth, and quality are no longer 
serious concerns, at least no more so than in any technology area. Are patents on 
these inventions still bad for business? I think the answer is no. 
Looking at the remaining complaints about business method and software patents, 
the primary concerns seem to be that these patents are not needed for innovation 
and that they affect R&D spending and market entry and exit. The main thrust of the 
argument that patents are not needed for innovation in this sector hinges around the 
idea that there was no shortage of innovation in this area even without protection. 
The reality, though, is that many business method and software inventions (not to 
mention many other types) are created out of need - the so-called user innovation. 87 
The idea of user innovation is borne out by looking at who obtains patents on business 
method and software inventions. Only one in ten patents is obtained by a financial 
services firm or payment system company, the typical business method businesses. 88 
More than one third of business method patents are granted to information and 
communication technology firms. 89 Other business method and software patents 
are scattered throughout various industries, many stemming from a problem that 
necessitated a solution that ended up being innovative. The idea that people invent 
to solve a problem they have is not unique to business methods and software, and 
yet we do not question the grant of patents in those other areas.9° The argument 
that patents are not needed to encourage innovation in the business method and 
software fields, in the absence of other issues such as quality, abstractness, and 
breadth, seems to have less import about whether or not there should be business 
method and software patents. 
Finally, the only remaining complaints about the negative effects of business 
method and software inventions are their potential to decrease R&D spending and 
adversely affect market exit and entry. And yet, the empirical literature, as discussed 
earlier, does not bear out these concerns. It may skew how we look at these events, but 
there is no clear indicator that patents cause a lack of competition and innovation, 
and in fact, they may even promote these things. 
8-
1 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. 
88 L. REv. 467 (2008). 
See remarks of Bob Hunt, Brookings Transcript, supra note 9, at i6. This number has been rising, however. See id 8 . 9 See id. 
90 See id. at 468. 
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So if business method and software patents can be properly examined by the PTO 
for requirements of patentability- including§ 102 novelty, § 103 nonobviousness, and 
§ 112 written description and enablement- and if the negative effects on competition 
and innovation can be addressed through this more thorough examination, then 
business method and soft\vare patents are really not all that bad. 
In fact, an argument can be made that these patents, if done right, are good for 
business. Although business methods and software can be produced with minimal 
front-end cost, more so for business methods than software, both types of invention 
are amenable to free-riding, because they are easily and inexpensively duplicable. 
Further, business method and software patents encourage disclosure of inventions 
that heretofore had been kept as trade secrets, a tradeoff for the grant of the monopoly. 
CONCLUSION 
The current state of patent eligibility for business method and software inventions 
is in disarray, but much of the discussion is focused in the wrong place. The tests 
implemented by the PTO and the courts, as well as examined in the literature, are 
aimed at the wrong target. The real problem is not substantive, determining whether 
these types of invention should be eligible for patent protection. Instead the quandary 
is much more procedural: Can the PTO adequately examine patent applications 
covering business method and software inventions? Procedural difficulties should 
not drive the law, particularly where the law being implemented shuts out the reality 
of business and industry today. 
Rather than continuing the dialog about whether business methods and software 
are statutory subject matter, we should take aim at the PTO's examining techniques 
and ensure that patent applications are being held to the appropriate level of scrutiny 
for written description, enablement, novelty, and nonobviousness. Because the bulk 
of the concerns about these patents arise from other patentability questions, this 
change would go a long way toward determining if business method and software 
patents are truly different from those in any other burgeoning field. Until this is 
fixed, there is no way we are going to hit the right target. 
